Network security · Cybersecurity strategy · AI-driven cyberattacks · Attack surface reduction · Network segmentation

Stop Trying to Outrun the Attacker. Take Away the Roads.

By Scott Fogarty · Published

Roads closed
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Germany's cybersecurity authorities have just issued another warning about the accelerating pace of cyberattack. The time between vulnerability disclosure and exploitation is shrinking dramatically. AI is making it faster and cheaper for attackers to find weaknesses and exploit them.

The cybersecurity industry's response is predictable: detect faster, analyze faster, patch faster, respond faster.

But that is the wrong guidance.

Instead of asking how quickly we can stop an attacker moving through our network, why aren't we asking how much of that network the attacker should be able to move through in the first place?

Earlier this week, I argued that we've built cybersecurity from the roof down, investing heavily in sophisticated defenses while neglecting the network foundation on which everything depends.

And I suggested that reversing this approach could fundamentally change three business outcomes: spending, exposure, and stability.

Here's why that distinction matters right now.

An autonomous attacker doesn't need to sleep, take breaks, or wait for an analyst. It can discover a vulnerable device, test an approach, learn from failure, and try another path at machine speed.

Our conventional response is to build systems that recognize and react to that activity just as quickly.

But that still leaves the attacker choosing where to go, what to try, and how often to try it.

We are allowing the attacker to set the terms of the contest.

Building security from the foundation up changes those terms.

Start with the network itself.

Know the ground. Know every device that's connected, including equipment your conventional security tools cannot see or protect.

Hold the ground. Determine which devices belong and which systems they actually need to communicate with. Eliminate unnecessary connections before an attacker discovers them.

Defend the ground. When a legitimate device is compromised and begins searching for its next target, make unauthorized reconnaissance encounter independently enforced boundaries rather than another opportunity.

This doesn't eliminate vulnerabilities. It doesn't make patching, detection, or incident response unnecessary.

It changes how much opportunity an attacker has while those defenses do their work.

And that changes the economics.

Every unnecessary path eliminated is one less opportunity to exploit. Every attack interrupted automatically is one less investigation that requires human intervention. Every compromised device contained before it can move further is one less opportunity for a local problem to become a business crisis.

The objective isn't simply to make defense faster. It's to make the attacker's job harder, more expensive, and less likely to succeed. The answer isn't to keep building a faster roof. It's to secure the foundation, and take away the roads the attacker needs.

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